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Using a novel dataset of listed firms in Japan, we find that bank lending to zombie 
(insolvent) borrowers induces these borrowers to manipulate earnings, resulting in 
more opaque financial reporting. Such an effect is more pronounced when the 
lending is from borrowers‘ main banks or for longer term loans, suggesting a 
complicity of informed banks in earnings manipulations. Further evidence shows a 
stronger nexus between zombie lending and earnings manipulation during election 
years, consistent with the political motivation argument. We overcome the 
endogeneity concern using a natural experiment arising from capital injections into 
banks instituted by the Japanese Government in the late 90‘s and find a consistent 
result. Further, we examine the industry spillover (contagion) effect of such 
accounting manipulation and find that profitable firms adopt more opaque 
reporting when the industry is dominated by zombie firms. Finally, we find that 
banks with greater incentives to inflate capital ratios lend more to zombie firms. 
Overall, our results suggest that keeping insolvent borrowers afloat deteriorates the 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Banks exert substantial influence on the capital allocation and risk sharing of 
client firms (Gerschenkron, 1962; Hellwig, 1991). By reallocating resources from 
less productive firms to more productive firms, banks can effectively contribute to 
the growth of productivity in an economy (Merton, 1993; Caballero and Hammour, 
1994, 1999). Nevertheless, empirical evidence from many studies shows that banks 
may choose to undertake evergreen lending, lending to fundamentally insolvent 
borrowers, to avoid regulatory scrutiny and hope that the non-performing 
borrowers can turn around and repay the loans (Boot, Greenbaum, and Thakor, 
1993; Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap, 2008; Hoshi 
and Kashyap, 2010). Such evergreen lending was particularly significant in Japan 
during the 1990s. In the Japanese context, Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008) 
coined the term ―zombie lending‖ to denote that such evergreen lending maintains 
firms that should be liquidated as going concerns. These firms are essentially dead 
but are kept alive with support from banks.  
While the extant literature focuses on the economy-wide real effects of 
zombie lending (Caballero and Hammour, 1994, 1999; Caballero, Hoshi, and 
Kashyap, 2008), few studies have looked at the impact of such lending on the 
accounting environment (Akerlof and Romer, 1993). Our paper examines this 
important but unstudied issue.  
The backdrop for zombie lending in Japan was the stagnating economy of the 
1990s and a crash in the real estate market. The Japanese government strongly 
encouraged banks to support troubled and potentially insolvent firms to keep the 
unemployment rate low (Tett and Ibison, 2001; Tett, 2003). Thus, banks were 
essentially forced to comply with governmental policies in this regard. At the same 
time, Japanese banks also had to comply with the international standards governing 
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minimum levels of capital (the Basel capital standards).
1
 How can a bank lend to 
insolvent borrowers and at the same time maintain sufficient capital consistent with 
the Basel accord? 
2
  
We argue that an inflation in earnings by zombie firms facilitated banks in 
zombie lending, serving both the government‘s goal of increasing employment and 
the bank‘s capital requirements. Specifically, by manipulating its financial 
statements, a zombie firm can make it easier for a bank to classify it as solvent 
even though it is actually insolvent. We find strong evidence consistent with this 
notion; zombie firms have greater abnormal accruals than non-zombie firms during 
the year they obtain new bank loans. We further use loan maturity as a proxy for 
relationship lending and find that longer term loans lead to more earnings inflation 
than shorter terms loans. Since long-term loans are typically made by relationship 
lenders, it appears unlikely that the bank is unaware of the accrual manipulations, 
especially given the long duration of the relationship between the main banks and 
borrowing firms in Japan (approximately 32 years, as documented in Uchida, Udell, 
and Watanabe, 2008). Next, we examine the impact of political motivations on the 
nexus between zombie lending and earnings manipulations. We find that the 
earnings manipulations due to zombie lending are more pronounced in election 
years, consistent with the notion that the observed effect on earnings manipulations 
is caused by purchasing political benefits.  
                                                          
1 The guideline published by Basle Committee in 1988 highlights the requirements on the core 
capital ratios (Part III, page 14), general provisions (Part II, page 5) and the implementation 
arrangement (Part IV, page 15). The details refer to http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.pdf. It is stated 
that ―Committee expects there to be no erosion of existing capital standards in individual member 
countries' banks‖. 
2 Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008) imply that the restructuring of loans to distressed firms can 
help reduce the required capital needed by banks. For example, in Japan, without such restructuring, 
banks would be forced to classify the loans to those borrowers as ―at risk,‖ which usually would 
require banks to set aside 70% of the loan value as loan loss reserves. With restructuring, banks need 
only move the loans to the ―special attention‖ category, which require reserves of at most 15%. 
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A second important issue that we examine is industry-level spillover effects. 
In particular, when zombie firms change their accounting opacity, non-zombie 
firms also change their accounting opacity. On the one hand, non-zombie firms can 
decrease their opacity so as to signal their better quality than zombie firms. On the 
other hand, providing high-quality financial statements can result in substantial 
costs to non-zombie firms. Thus, the quality of financial reporting that non-zombie 
firms provide is determined by the change in the trade-off between the cost and 
benefit of high-quality reporting in the presence of zombie rivals.   
First, the cost for non-zombie firms to provide high-quality financial 
statements increases when the industry is dominated by zombie firms. In particular, 
precise financial information can facilitate competitors‘ investment and thus is 
costly when the product market competition is severe (Gigler, 1994; Bushman and 
Smith, 2001; Bagnoli and Watts, 2010; Corona and Nan, 2011). From a 
non-zombie firm‘s perspective, high zombie density suggests that more rivals can 
sell the same product at a lower price and thus a non-zombie firm is placed in an 
unfavorable position (Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap, 2008). As a result, 
non-zombie firms can strategically choose to bias their accounting numbers so as 
to misguide zombie firms and protect their market share.
3
  
We find that profitable firms are associated with a higher level of reporting 
opacity when their industry is dominated by zombie firms. This contagion effect, 
specifically, the transmission of poor reporting quality from some firms to others in 
the same industry, is more pronounced in concentrated industries and industries 
with fewer growth opportunities. This is consistent with the contagion effect of 
opacity due to oligopolistic competition (Bagnoli and Watts, 2010).  
                                                          
3 The banks‘ subsidization of zombie firms places non-zombie firms in an unfavorable competitive 
position and crowds out effective investment by non-zombie firms (Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap, 
2008).   
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Second, hidden losses due to zombie lending induce banks to lend 
aggressively, thereby reducing the benefit to non-zombie firms of separating 
themselves from zombie firms by providing better quality financial statements 
(Kane, 1989; Niinimaki, 2007). In line with this argument, we find that the 
contagion effect is more pronounced when non-zombie firms‘ relationship banks 
have been heavily exposed to zombie lending. In addition, in a zombie-intensive 
industry, the cost of debt does not increase when non-zombie firms adopt opaque 
financial reporting. This result confirms the lax screening argument stated above. 
Finally, we investigate the association between banks‘ incentives for 
accounting manipulation and zombie lending. We find that banks with a larger loan 
loss provision (LLP), banks with more non-performing loans (NPLs), and 
under-capitalized banks lend more money to zombie firms. Based on the 
aforementioned results on zombie lending and reporting opacity, there appears to 
be a transmission mechanism through which reporting opacity is transmitted from 
banks to bank clients and then from bank clients to their industrial peers.  
An alternative explanation of our findings is that un-modeled variables can 
affect banks‘ subsidization and firms‘ opacity simultaneously. We address this 
endogeneity and establish causality from bank subsidization to financial reporting 
opacity in several ways.  
First, we use industry multiplied by year fixed effects in addition to a broad 
range of firm characteristics to attenuate the concern that omitted variables may be 
affecting both decisions (Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap, 2008). Second, we 
employ a two-stage treatment regression, using the employment-to-asset ratio at 
the firm level as an instrument for the likelihood of zombie lending. Firms with a 
high value for this ratio are likely favored by the government as candidates for 
zombie lending. However, there is no theoretical justification for the 
5 
 
employment-to-asset ratio to be related to the opacity of firms‘ financial reporting. 
Both of these tests yield results similar to the baseline result.  
To further identify the causal channel, we identify an exogenous shock to 
zombie lending caused by a capital injection program instituted by the Japanese 
government in 1998 and 1999 to recapitalize weak banks. During this period, 30 
trillion JPY in public funds were injected into the banking system and 20 major 
banks received these capital injections (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010). We examine 
the change in firms‘ reporting opacity in response to this exogenous shock on their 
bank‘s balance sheets. We hypothesize that banks receiving capital injections are 
more likely to engage in zombie lending as the government has significantly more 
leverage over such banks‘ lending decisions than it does over banks that do not 
receive capital injections. To the extent that banks encourage manipulations via 
accruals, this implies that the change in banks‘ incentives for zombie lending will 
also be reflected in their borrowing firm‘s accrual manipulations.  
Our empirical result confirms this conjecture. In particular, zombie firms that 
have a greater percentage of borrowing from banks receiving capital injections are 
associated with a greater degree of deterioration in reporting quality during the 
capital injection period than zombie firms with a smaller percentage of borrowing 
from banks receiving capital injections. This result is consistent with the prediction 
of a causal association between bank lending to zombie firms and more opaque 
reporting.  
Our paper makes the following contributions. First, it contributes to the 
literature on the importance of restructuring in a stagnating economy. Depressed 
restructuring and keeping incumbent firms afloat result in a severe negative impact 
on economic growth (Caballero and Hammour, 1994, 1999; Caballero, Hoshi, and 
Kashyap, 2008). Our work is important in that it provides additional evidence of 
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the negative impact of depressed restructuring – accounting opacity – which has 
not been explored before. Second, our work contributes to the literature on bank‘s 
lending incentive and borrowers‘ reporting quality. Prior studies mainly emphasize 
how banks demand for better quality financial statement so as to effectively 
evaluate the creditworthiness of the borrowers (e.g., Watts, 1993, 2003). However, 
in this paper, we argue that banks can encourage earnings manipulations in some 
situations. There can be collusion between banks and borrowers in cooking 
borrowers‘ book. Finally, this work is related to the literature on information 
spillover within industries (Tse and Tucker, 2010; Bagnoli and Watts, 2010; 
Acharya, DeMarzo, and Kremer, 2011; Corona and Nan, 2011). We find that banks‘ 
subsidization of an insolvent borrower not only negatively affects the reporting 
quality of the borrower but also that of its healthy industrial peers.  
Although this study is based on Japanese data, credit misallocation and the 
zombie lending phenomenon are not unique to Japan. For example, during the 
savings and loan crisis in the 1980s, banks continuously rolled over loans to 
insolvent borrowers in the US (Akerlof and Romer, 1993), and in the 1990s, banks 
in Nordic countries renewed loans to non-performing borrowers (Drees and 
Pazarbasioglu, 1995). Results documented here can shed light on the mechanisms 
through which such lending is possible in other economies as well.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
institutional background. Section 3 develops hypotheses. Section 4 describes the 
data and empirical design. Section 5 presents and discusses empirical results. 










Chapter 2. Institutional background 
The Japanese economy expanded rapidly from 1984 through 1989. The 
Nikkei 225 Stock Index was around 10,000 in 1984 and reached a peak of 38,916 
on December 29, 1989. Concerned about overheating in the economy, the Bank of 
Japan increased the discount rate and imposed limits on commercial banks‘ lending 
to real estate-related projects, resulting in tighter credit. Both equity and property 
prices fell dramatically by the end of 1990 as a result. For example, the Nikkei 225 
Stock Index fell sharply from the beginning of the year to 20,222 on October 1, 
1990. Also, the Japanese economy contracted significantly during this period.  
This contraction impaired collateral values and created tremendous problems 
in the banking system. However, to maintain the international image of the country, 
the Japanese government and banks denied the existence of these problems and 
deferred restructuring of the banking system for a variety of reasons. One 
important and widely documented reason is that the restructuring of a banking 
system can lead to a massive bankruptcy wave and high unemployment (Tett and 
Ibison, 2001; Tett, 2003; Peek and Rosengren, 2005; Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010). 
To stimulate private investment and employment, the government implicitly and 
explicitly encouraged private banks to direct their lending to troubled firms, 
claiming that an increase in lending to these firms would ―ease the credit crunch‖ 
(Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap, 2008). Such a requirement is not surprising since 
politicians have incentive to maintain a seemingly high employment rate to win 
more votes (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). However, such loosened lending policies 
inevitably leaded to serious concerns about the existing problems in banking 




To mitigate the concerns from international regulators and investors, the 
Japanese government pressured banks to comply with the Basel standards, 
according to which banks must maintain a minimum capital ratio and establish a 
proper internal control system.
4
 By doing so, the Japanese government claimed 
that the problems in banking system had been under controlled (Tett and Ibison, 
2001; Tett, 2003).  
Although to support troubled firms and to comply with Basel standards are 
congruent with the societal norms, they carry an inherent contradiction. In 
particular, to strengthen the banks, it is crucial to recognize nonperforming loans in 
a timely manner, forcing banks to write off existing assets and raise additional 
capital to maintain the required level of capital. However, if banks attempt to do so, 
insolvent firms will be forced to restructure and economic activities supported by 
these bad loans or assets will halt. The resulting economic weakness can aggravate 
a deteriorating employment condition. 
As a consequence, these two contradicting requirements of the Japanese 
government caused banks to roll over existing non-performing loans. Specially, by 
undertaking evergreen lending, a bank could serve the government‘s purposes of (1) 
keeping troubled firms afloat and preventing the unemployment rate from 
deteriorating and (2) inflating the capital rate to comply with the Basel standards. 
Thus, evergreen lending (zombie lending) was particularly popular in Japan. 
Figure 1 shows the percentage of evergreen lending from 1990 to 2000 using 
Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap‘s (2008) measure of zombie firms. Details on how 
firms are identified as zombie firms are described in the next section. As shown in 
                                                          
4 According to Prompt Corrective Action (PCA), the regulators are allowed to intervene the 
management of banks with an capital ratio below the regulatory minimum level, making failure to 




Figure 1, roughly 5% of listed firms received subsidization from banks in the early 
1990s. This number grew to around 20% in the late 1990s. This trend in the 
number of zombie firms is consistent with the notion that the government bailout 
in the late 1990s aggravated banks‘ inefficient subsidizations of insolvent 
borrowers (Tett and Ibison, 2001; Tett, 2003; Peek and Rosengren, 2005; Hoshi 
and Kashyap, 2010).  
It has to be noted that both the government and informed banks were aware of 
the poor performance of zombie borrowers. From government‘s perspective, 
zombie lending can increase the employment rate and make the banks appear to 
comply with Basel standards, improving the international image of the country. 
From banks‘ perspective, zombie lending can help to fulfill Japanese government 
and regulator‘s purposes. However, the international investors and regulators were 
not able to effectively evaluate the severity of the problems in both the real and 















Chapter 3. Hypothesis development 
3.1. Zombie lending, earnings manipulation, and the evolution of reporting opacity 
The costs related to bank loan defaults provide incentive for banks to screen 
and monitor borrowers (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). However, a bank‘s 
monitoring incentive can be distorted by the capital adequacy requirement. In 
particular, when banks are short on capital and face significant regulatory costs, 
they are motivated to roll over existing bad loans to avoid an increase in loan loss 
provisions (Boot, Greenbaum, and Thakor, 1993; Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; 
Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap, 2008; Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010; Tett, 2003; 
Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap, 2008). In this circumstance, banks are actually 
aware of the borrowers‘ bad performance but choose to ignore their credit profiles 
and covenant maintenance.  
In zombie lending, banks can even have incentive to encourage earnings 
manipulation. On the one hand, to serve the government‘s goal of increasing the 
employment rate, it is necessary for banks to support these insolvent borrowers. On 
the other hand, banks must comply with the Basel standards governing their 
lending activities.
5
 That is, banks also seek to ensure that they operate within the 
bounds and norms of their respective societies (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). Thus, 
these banks must find a way to make evergreen lending eligible and justify the 
creditworthiness of this non-performing borrower. To the extent that profitability is 
one of the most important factors when assessing the creditworthiness (Feschijan, 
2008), one solution for banks is to encourage zombie borrowers to inflate their 
accounting performance and pretend to be solvent borrowers. By promoting 
earnings manipulations, banks can early classify an insolvent firm (zombie firm) as 
                                                          
5 Basel Accord took full effect in 1993. All banks needed to publicly report ratios in accordance with 
the Japanese Bankers Association (zenginkyo) criteria.  
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solvent and legitimate lending to it.
6
 In addition, by pretending that insolvent 
borrowers are solvent, banks do not have to increase their loan loss provision and 
thus effectively inflate their capital ratios.  
Therefore, banks are motivated to hide information and obscure information 
about borrowers‘ fundamentals. 7  Such earnings manipulation will inevitably 
increase the information opaqueness of the borrowers (Sloan, 1996). As a result, 
we conjecture that evergreen lending to zombie borrowers induces these borrowers 
to manipulate earnings, resulting in a more opaque information environment.
8
 This 
leads to our first hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1(a):  Lending to zombie firms is associated with positive 
earnings manipulation. 
 




3.2. Government intervention and evergreen lending to zombie firms  
The traditional neoclassical model suggests that government intervention in 
the credit market can correct market failures and benefit bank-dependent firms 
through reduced uncertainty and precautionary savings (Stiglitz, 1989a, 1989b; 
Gamba and Triantis, 2008; Riddick and Whited, 2009). However, another stream 
                                                          
6 Alternatively, banks can change their internal risk control procedures and make evergreen lending 
easier to approve. However, it has to be noted that banks regulated by the Basel standards have little 
discretion on manipulating the internal systems (Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, 1998). 
Thus, compared to changing the internal pricing models, encouraging clients to manipulate their 
earnings seems to be less costly and more implementable (Cerqueiro, Degryse, and Ongena, 2011). 
7 Zombie firms are not able and not willing to eliminate the effect of banks‘ information monopolies. 
First, raising capital directly from public equity or debt markets may not be feasible or may be too 
costly for these firms due to their poor performance. Second, zombie firms could not be saved 
without banks‘ support.  
8 An alternative explanation that we do not visit in the paper is that a borrower‘s opaque financial 
statements enable an incumbent bank to maintain its information advantages. Compared to dispersed 
shareholders and bondholders who rely more on public disclosures to evaluate the economic status of 
firms, an incumbent bank is more informed and able to acquire private information (Diamond, 1984). 
This relative information advantage allows an incumbent bank to capture a greater share of the 
surplus generated from the relationship with the borrowers in good states (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992) 
and transfer the costs of subsidization to other stockholders in bad states (Alissa, Bonsall, Koharki, 
and Penn Jr., 2013). 
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of literature argues that government intervention is associated with severe moral 
hazard problems in the sense that a quid pro quo can exist between politicians and 
firms for employment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). For example, in Japan in the 
1990s, the government required (implicitly and explicitly) private banks to 
continue their policies of forbearance to avoid massive firm failures and thereby 
reduce associated financial and political costs. As documented by Tett (2003), the 
Financial Supervisory Agency required Shinsei Bank, a Japanese bank with foreign 
ownership, to support troubled firms. In return, the government could bail out 
banks when they were in trouble (Tett and Ibison, 2001; Tett, 2003; Peek and 
Rosengren, 2005; Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010).  
The Japanese government‘s bailout of banks in the form of capital injections 
in the banking system during the late 1990s confirms such a conjecture. The 
bailout was initially motivated by the failure of two securities companies and a 
regional bank in 1997. On February 16, 1998, Japan‘s government approved the 
Financial Function Stabilization Act, under which 30 trillion JPY of public funds 
were injected into the banking system. In particular, 17 trillion JPY were dedicated 
to protecting the depositors of failed banks and 13 trillion JPY were used for 
recapitalizations in 20 major banks in Japan (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010). The first 
recapitalization did not successfully stabilize the financial system and additional 
injections were needed. The second recapitalization began in March 1999 and 
benefitted 15 banks. The amount injected was more than four times the previous 
injection amount, and it appeared to calm the financial markets.  
As expected, there was a quid pro quo between the Japanese government and 
the aided banks for employment. For example, when the Long-Term Credit Bank 
returned to private ownership after the government bailout in the late 1990s, a 
condition for the sale was that the new owners would maintain lending to troubled 
14 
 
small and medium-sized borrowers so as to fulfill its ―social responsibility.‖ An 
estimated half of the public funds injected into the banking system in 1998 and 
1999 was used to support zombie firms (Tett and Ibison, 2001; Peek and 
Rosengren, 2005). We also confirm such an increase in evergreen lending after 
1998 (see Figure 1).  
Based on the aforementioned evidence, we argue that Japan‘s capital 
injections into the banking system affected the quantity of subsidized loans that 
zombie firms obtained. However, there is no theoretical justification for the 
government bailout to be associated with the opacity of borrowers‘ financial 
statements. Thus, capital injections in the banking system served as an exogenous 
experiment. Specifically, zombie firms with a large exposure to recapitalized banks 
could obtain more support from banks after 1998 (Giannetti and Simonov, 2012) 
and should have been associated with a larger increase in reporting opacity if the 
causal effect was from bank lending to reporting opacity. This leads to our second 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2:  Zombie firms with a close relationship with recapitalized 
banks are associated with a greater increase in reporting 
opacity after bank recapitalization. 
 
 
3.3. Contagion of reporting opacity 
A vast amount of literature has documented that good firms can benefit from 
providing high-quality financial statements because doing so can mitigate the 
information asymmetry problem (Grossman, 1981; Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and 
Schipper, 2004; Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia, 2007). In the ideal world 
articulated by Grossman (1981), good firms always have incentive to provide 
better quality reporting to separate themselves from bad firms, as long as the 
verification cost is low or at least predetermined.  
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However, providing a high-quality financial statement to the public is not 
without cost to a firm because competitors can use available information about the 
firm to their own advantage (Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1986; Darrough and 
Stoughton, 1990; Wagenhofer, 1990). Even in the framework of mandatory 
discourse, the cost of truthful reporting is not predetermined but can increase with 
the level of precision in the discourse. Thus, good firms can have incentive to 
deviate from truthful reporting when the benefit of misleading rivals through 
biased reporting outweighs the cost of truthful reporting (Gigler, 1994; Bushman 




The prevalence of zombie firms in an industry will affect both the cost and the 
benefit of non-zombie firms providing high-quality financial statements and 
separating themselves from zombie firms. Specifically, Caballero, Hoshi, and 
Kashyap (2008) suggest that non-zombie firms are often placed in an unfavorable 
competitive position because their rivals (zombie firms) are subsidized by banks 
and can sell products at a lower price. When zombie density is high, non-zombie 
firms face a greater challenge in protecting their market share.
10
 In such a 
circumstance, truthful reporting is costlier for non-zombie firms as high-quality 
financial reporting can facilitate their competitors‘ (zombie firms‘) investment 
decisions, imposing a further threat to non-zombie firms‘ market share (Bagnoli 
and Watts, 2010; Corona and Nan, 2011). Thus, it is rational for non-zombie firms 
                                                          
9 This point can be easily proved using Grossman‘s (1981) model. When the cost of truthful 
reporting is taken into account, equation (7) in Grossman (1981) can be rewritten as 
p{ϒ[D(qi)]}-c[D(qi)]≥pi-ci where c[D(qi)] is the cost associated with report strategy D when the true 
value is qi, ; and ci is the cost of truthful reporting when the true value is qi,. As ci is larger than c[D(qi)] 
(truthful reporting provides more precise information to rivals), then ∃D such that p{ϒ[D(qi)]}< pi 
and equation (9) can hold. Thus, it can be the case that the seller would make the same disclosure for 
two different q's, say qi and qj, with pi > pj. Thus, lying is possible and good firms can have incentive 
to deviate from truthful reporting.  
10 The number of competitors (zombie firms) that can sell products at a lower price is larger when 
the industry is dominated by zombie firms.  
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The benefit for non-zombie firms of providing high-quality financial 
statements is reduced when an industry is dominated by zombie firms. Specifically, 
a high zombie density suggests massive hidden losses in banks specializing in that 
industry. This exposure to hidden losses induces banks to take excess risks and 
gamble for resurrection by lending aggressively in the hope that an increase in loan 
interest income can help them avoid bankruptcy (Jensen and Mackling, 1976; Kane, 
1989; Niinimaki, 2007). An aggressive lending policy implies lax screening, 
leading to a lower credit spread between good firms and bad.
12 
 As a result, the 
perceived value of being classified as a good firm (non-zombie firm) is reduced 
when an industry is dominated by zombie firms.  
Therefore, a higher zombie density not only increases the cost for a 
non-zombie firm to provide high-quality financial statements but also reduces the 
benefit for the non-zombie firm to do so. Thus, in equilibrium, a non-zombie firm 
in an industry with a high zombie density will have lower reporting quality than a 
non-zombie firm in an industry with a lower zombie density.
13 
 This leads to our 
third hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3:  Non-zombie firms adopt more opaque financial reporting if 
their industry is dominated by zombie firms. 
 
 
3.4. Bank capital adequacy and bank lending  
                                                          
11 For example, a non-zombie firm can overstate (understate) its profitability, conveying a positive 
(negative) signal of growth opportunity and inducing zombie firms to over- (under-)invest (Gigler, 
1994; Bushman and Smith, 2001; Beatty, Liao, and Yu, 2013).  
12 Rolling over existing loan to insolvent borrowers does not mean that banks can identify every bad 
firm and good firm. Banks still need to screen borrowers using interest as a mechanism when lending 
to new borrowers. 
13 We are not arguing that non-zombie firms try to pool zombie firms when the industry is dominated 
by zombie firms. Instead, we argue that even in a separating equilibrium, non-zombie firm provides a 
relatively lower quality financial statement if the zombie density is higher.  
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Bank capital regulation is used to mitigate the moral hazard problem 
associated with the provision of deposit insurance and other government 
guarantees (Greenbaum and Thakor, 1995). In the early 1990s, regulators all over 
the world required banks to hold tier 1 capital not lower than 4% (8% for banks 
with international branches). In Japan, this capital standard for domestic small 
banks became effective in 1989. Banks with international branches were also 
required to achieve the benchmark by March 1993.  
To meet this standard, banks in Japan took various measures to increase their 
capital ratio, including curtailing lending and issuing new equity. However, stock 
prices fell sharply during this period, making the issuance of equity very costly. 
Faced with increasing regulatory costs, capital-constrained banks had to rely on 
accounting gimmicks, including manipulating the loan loss provision and realizing 
security gains, to inflate their capital ratios (Shrieves and Dahl, 2003; Peek and 
Rosengren, 2005; Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, Liu, and Rhee, 2007). However, the 
question of how banks could effectively manipulate their earnings and thus their 
capital ratios remained. Conceptually, banks can understate loan loss reserves in 
order to disguise a deteriorating quality of its loan portfolio and increase the capital 
ratio. Such behaviours are highly possible in Japan since the determination of loss 
reserves was setting according to the loan classifications.
14
 By restructuring bad 
loans, a bank can shift bad loans from the category ―at risk,‖ which requires the 
bank to set aside at most 70% of the loan value as a loan loss reserve, to ―special 
                                                          
14 The rules on loan classifications on Japan were issued in 1989. Commercial banks are required to 
make provisions according to the loan categories. Banks‘ loan portfolios are to be classified in 
accordance with guidelines established under MAS (MUNK Advisory Service) Notice 612 into the 
following five categories: (1) Normal, (2) special attention, (3) substandard, (4) at risk, and (5) loss. 
When the principal or interest payments are over-due for more than three months, the loans need to 
be classified as non-performing loans (NPLs). Provisioning is based on the unsecured portion of the 
loan and assessed a minimum of 10% for substandard loans, 50% for doubtful loans, and 100% for 
bad loans. For multiple loans to a same client, banks just need to classify one of the loan and other 




attention,‖ which requires reserves of at most 15% (Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap, 
2008).  
Thus, through evergreen lending, a bank can hide losses and inflate earnings 
and therefore its capital ratios. Based on these arguments, we expect banks with 
greater incentive to inflate capital ratios to undertake more zombie lending. This 
leads to our fourth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4:  Banks with greater incentive to inflate capital ratios lend 






Chapter 4. Data and variable definitions 
4.1 Data collection 
Our main sample consists of all listed firms in Japan, excluding financial 
institutions, from 1990 through 2000. We choose to start our sample from 1990 to 
capture the economic downturn in the early 1990s when zombie lending became 
significant. In addition, this sample period covers bank recapitalization events from 
1998 through 2000, which provides us with an ideal experiment to overcome the 
endogeneity concern.  
Accounting information of borrowers and bank loan information are obtained 
from the Nikkei Corporate Financial Database (Nikkei) and Nikkei Bank Loan 
Database, respectively. The Nikkei Bank Loan database includes loans outstanding 
from all relationship banks for each firm at the fiscal year-end. The bank 
accounting information comes from the Bankscope database. We obtain 24,193 
firm-year observations with adequate loan information from 1990 through 2000. 
 
4.2. Variable definition 
4.2.1. Zombie firm 
Our prime measure of ―zombie‖ follows Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap 
(2008). In particular, we define the lower bound of interest that a firm should pay 
during fiscal year i as the following: 
    
                    ∑       
 
                                       
                     ,                                                 (1)                                         
where rs is the short-term loan prime rate, BS is the short-term loan outstanding, rl 
is the long-term prime rate, BL is the long-term loan outstanding, rcb is the 
observed minimum coupon rate for a convertible bond, and Bond is the bond 
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outstanding. If the interest expenditure of a firm during a given fiscal year is lower 
than the corresponding minimum amount, implying that the firm is heavily 
subsidized, we define it as a zombie firm for the year. By definition, the measure 
of ‗zombie‘ emphasizes the subsidization from banks rather than a firm‘s 
performance. If the definition of zombie is based on firms‘ operating 
characteristics, then by definition zombie firms as well as industries dominated by 
zombie firms would have low profitability and low growth (Caballero, Hoshi, and 
Kashyap, 2008) and a greater likelihood of being associated with opaque financial 
reporting. Therefore, we are not forcing a correlation between ―zombie‖ and 
opaque financial reporting but are providing evidence of this correlation. In 
Figures 2 through 4, we show that industries dominated by zombie firms are 
associated with lower employment growth, less capital investment, and lower 
return on assets (ROA), which is consistent with Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap 
(2008). These graphs confirm that the measure of zombie captures the 
poor-performing firms.  
In unreported tests, we modify Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap‘s (2008) 
measure with two additional performance criteria. In particular, firms with 
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) exceeding the hypothetical risk-free 
interest payments are excluded from being classified as zombie firms and firms 
that are unprofitable and highly leveraged (higher than 0.5) and those that have 
increased their external borrowings are classified as zombie firms. Our main 
results are qualitatively the same when using this alternative measure.  
 
4.2.2 Earning manipulation 
We first use the modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995) 
to estimate earnings manipulation behaviors. Specifically, we estimate the 
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following cross-sectional regression using firms in each industry for each fiscal 
year between 1990 and 2000: 
     
            
  
 
          
  
         
          
  
      
          
     ,               (2) 
where  is the total accruals for firm i during year t, denotes total assets for firm i 
in year t-1,  denotes the change in sales for firm i in year t relative to year t-1, and  
denotes the capital for firm i in year t. Abnormal accrual as a percentage of lagged 
assets for firm i in year t is computed using estimated coefficients of Equation (2):  
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), (3)                 
where  denotes the change in accounts receivables for firm i in year t relative to 
year t-1. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995, 1996) show that discretionary 
accruals gradually increase as the alleged year of manipulation approaches and 
then exhibit a sharp decline after that. The increase in discretionary accruals 
reflects earnings inflation behaviors while the decline is consistent with the 
reversal of prior overstatements in earnings.
15 
 In line with this argument, in 
Figure 5, we plot the discretionary accruals of zombie and non-zombie firms 
around the year when they receive new credits from banks. The figure shows large 
and positive discretionary accruals recorded by zombie firms in the year they 
received new lending and negative discretionary accruals before and after the event 
year. For non-zombie firms, though we also observe an increase in discretionary 
accruals before and during the event year, the magnitude is much more moderate.  
                                                          
15 One concern about the measure of abnormal accrual comes from the differences between US 
accounting standards and Japanese accounting standards. Japan‘s accounting system mainly follows a 
German system and could differ from that in the US or UK. To resolve this concern, we conduct 
additional tests to verify the validity of the estimated abnormal accruals. The extant literature 
suggests that firm-years in the interval just right of zero manage their earnings to report income 
marginally above zero. In line with this argument, we also find a discontinuity at zero ROA for 
Japanese firms. We define the firm-year in the interval to the immediate right of zero (from 0 to 0.005) 
as a suspect observation. We find that estimated abnormal accruals using the modified Jones model 




We also employ the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model to estimate abnormal 
working capital accruals. This measure of earnings quality captures the mapping of 
working capital accruals into the cash flows of the prior period, current period, and 
subsequent period. Earnings that map more closely into cash flows are of high 
quality. Specifically, we estimate the following cross-sectional regression using 
firms in each industry for each fiscal year between 1990 and 2000: 
      
          
    
              
          
  
            
          
  
              
          
     ,  (4) 
where  is the total working capital accrual for firm i during year t and  denotes 
the operating cash flows for firm i in year t relative to year t-1. Abnormal working 
capital accruals are estimated by: 
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                                                            (5) 
4.2.3. Financial reporting opacity 
Our main measure of reporting opacity follows Hutton, Marcus, and 
Tehranian‘s (2009) approach. We do not use market-based measures as our main 
measures of earning manipulation and reporting opacity because the equity market 
from 1990 through 2000 was extremely volatile and resulted in unreliable 
market-based measures (Goyal and Yamada, 2004). Following Hutton, Marcus, 
and Tehranian (2009), we use a three-year moving average absolute value of 
abnormal accrual to capture the reporting opacity. The underlying rationale is that 
firms with consistently large absolute values of abnormal accruals are more likely 
to have managed their reported earnings (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995, 
1996; Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian, 2009).  
     Opacity i, t =1/3(|Abacci, t|+| Abacci, t+1 |+| Abacci, t+2 |).               (6)                                       
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In robustness tests, we investigate the long-run earnings response coefficient (ERC) 
and the reporting conservatism (Basu, 1997) of zombie firms that received new 















Chapter 5. Empirical results 
5.1. Summary statistics 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for key variables in our empirical analysis. 
Our full sample comprises 24,193 firm-year observations. The mean percentage of 
zombie lending is around 10% for the whole sample. In panel A, we summarize the 
characteristics of all sample firms. The mean (median) value of opacity is 0.040 
(0.029). This magnitude is consistent with Chung, Ho, and Kim‘s (2004) finding 
using Japanese data. In panel B, we further compare the characteristics of zombie 
firms with those of non-zombie firms. The result indicates that the zombie firm is 
associated with more opaque financial reporting, higher leverage, and lower 
profitability.  
In panel C, we apply univariate analysis to investigate the change in opacity 
of zombie firms in response to increases in evergreen lending during 1998 and 
1999 (Hypothesis 2). The change in opacity is defined as the difference between 
the three-year average absolute abnormal accruals before and after 1998. Thus, the 
sample period of this panel spans from 1995 to 2000. We use a firm‘s percentage 
of borrowing from aided banks to measure its exposure to the capital injection 
program. In particular, the following equation is used: 
Capital Injection Exposurei,t = ∑j(Borrowing_from_bankj,I  × Aided_Bank 
indicatorj / Total_borrowingi),       (7) 
                               
where the Aided_Bank_indicator equals 1 if bank j received a capital injection 
during 1998 and 1999. We further stratify the sample based on the sample median 
value of capital injection exposure and classify zombie firms with a higher than 
sample median level exposure to the capital injection program as treatment 
samples. Other zombie firms are classified as control samples. The result shows 
that treatment zombie firms are associated with a greater increase in reporting 
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opacity after the capital injection. This result supports our hypothesis 2 that a 
government bailout program encourages zombie lending and thus leads to 
deterioration in reporting quality.   
 
5.2. Multivariate results  
5.2.1. Zombie lending and earnings manipulation. 
A key argument of this paper centers on the point that banks‘ lending induces 
zombie firms to manipulate their earnings and therefore results in more opaque 
financial statements. To establish this argument, we show that (1) lending to 
zombie firms is associated with positive earnings manipulation and (2) lenders are 
aware of such earnings manipulation.  
First, as discussed earlier, we plot the abnormal accruals of both zombie firms 
and non-zombie firms around the lending event years. As shown in Figure 5, on 
average, new lending to zombie firms is associated with greater manipulations in 
earnings during the event year and a sharp reversal in the following years. We 
further employ the following model to test for upward manipulations of earnings 
by zombie firms when lending takes place: 
  Abnormal accruali,t = b0+ b1Zombiei,t-1 + b2 Zombiei,t-1 × New Crediti,t + b3 
New Crediti,t + b4Sizei,t-1 + b5Turni,t-1 + b6Growthi,t-1 + 
b7Booklevi,t-1 + b8CFOi,t-1 + b9ROAi,t-1 + Industry × 
Year + εi,t,                                (8) 
 
where new credit is the log of an increase in total loan outstanding relative to that 
in the previous year. We use the modified Jones model to estimate abnormal total 
accruals and the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model to estimate the abnormal 
working capital accruals, respectively. We include control variables following 
prior literature (Dechow, 1994; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Chen, Lin, and Lin, 
2008; Chi, Dhaliwal, Li, and Lin, 2012). Specifically, we control firm size (Sizei,t-1), 
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measured as the natural log of a firm‘s total assets at the end of the previous fiscal 
year; sales-to-asset ratio (Turni,t-1); firm leverage (Booklevi,t-1), defined as total debt 
scaled by total assets; firm profitability (ROAi,t-1), defined as EBIT divided by total 
assets; and cash flows (CFO i,t-1), defined as cash flows divided by total assets. 
Following Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008), we further control for 
industry-year fixed effects to take into account possible omitted industry 
characteristics.  
Based on Hypothesis 1(a), the coefficient on Zombiei, t-1 × New Crediti, t 
should be positive. The coefficient on Size is expected to be negative (Dechow and 
Dichev, 2002), the coefficient on Growth to be positive (Chen, Lin, and Lin, 2008), 
and the coefficient on CFO to be negative (Dechow, 1994). Results reported in 
column (1) of panel A show that the coefficient on the interaction term between 
zombie and New credit is positive and significant, implying that new lending to 
zombie firms encourages them to inflate their earnings. This result is consistent 
with the notion that ―lending rules,‖ which are beyond banks‘ discretion, are more 
stringent for big loans (Cerqueiro, Degryse, and Ongena, 2011). For control 
variables, our results are consistent with prior studies. Specifically, the coefficient 
on SIZE is negative and significant, suggesting that larger firms have higher 
reporting quality (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). Dechow (1994) showed that cash 
flow is negatively associated with discretionary accruals.  A similar association is 
found in our estimation. We also find that growth opportunity (GROWTH) is 
negatively associated with reporting quality, consistent with Chen, Lin, and Lin 
(2008). 
One interpretation of the above results could be that zombie firms misguide 
uninformed lenders by inflating earnings. To rule out this interpretation, we need 
to show that lenders have sufficient private information about zombie borrowers 
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and therefore are aware of the earnings manipulation. In particular, we test the 
effect of lending from main banks and longer term lending on earnings 
manipulation.  
Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990) find that when main banks‘ client 
firms become financially distressed, the main banks orchestrate bailouts and 
assume disproportionate responsibility for bad debts. This propping up leads main 
banks to monitor client firms closely. Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe (2008) suggest 
that the lending relationship between a main bank and a borrower could be as long 
as 32 years. Given such close relationships between main banks and their clients, 
lending from a main bank should be relationship based and associated with more 
private information. Thus, we argue that if lending from main banks leads to more 
earnings manipulation, there can be collusion between banks and zombie 
borrowers in manipulating borrowers‘ financial reporting. 
We create an indicator that equals 1 if a firm receives new credits from its 
main banks and 0 otherwise. The zombie indicator is interacted with the main bank 
lending indicator to test the incremental effect of main bank lending on borrowers‘ 
reporting quality. Results reported in column (2) show that the coefficient on the 
interaction term between the main bank and zombie indicator is positive and 
significant. However, we find an insignificant association between lending from 
other banks and zombie borrowers‘ earnings manipulations. Thus, we argue that 
our results can be best explained by the argument that banks encourage zombie 
borrowers to inflate their earnings to legitimize evergreen lending. 
Our second proxy for lenders‘ possession of information on zombie borrowers 
is the tenor of the credit. Transaction-specific lending, which can be proxied by 
short-term lending, is less likely to be associated with private information while 
long-term lending, which is more relationship based, is associated with more 
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private information. Thus, we use the tenor of the lending as a proxy for informed 
lending and test whether informed lending is associated with an increase in 
abnormal accruals. 
Results show that the coefficient on the interaction term between long-term 
new credit and the zombie indicator is positive and significant (coef. =0.004; 
se=0.002). In contrast, the coefficient on the interaction term between short-term 
new credit and zombie is positive but insignificant. That is, when lenders have 
more information on borrowers‘ credit profiles, the lending actually results in more 
opaque financial statements. This evidence is consistent with the notion of 
complicity on the part of banks in manipulating financial reporting to legitimize 
evergreen lending.  
In panel B, we employ the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model to estimate 
abnormal working capital accruals. If there is window dressing-type manipulation, 
one would expect abnormal working capital accruals to increase when zombie 
firms receive new credits from banks. Results consistently show that the 
coefficients on the interaction term between the zombie indicator and new credit 
are positive and significant, suggesting that zombie firms receiving new loans 
inflate their earnings. We also find that such an effect is more pronounced for 
longer term loans. These findings reinforce our argument that banks encourage 
zombie borrowers to manipulate earnings to achieve lending legitimacy.   
 
5.2.2 Zombie lending and the evolution of financial reporting opacity 
In this section, we establish the causal effect from bank lending to zombie 
firms‘ financial reporting opacity (Hypothesis 1(b)). Following Hutton, Marcus, 
and Tehranian (2009), we define opacity as the three-year moving average absolute 
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value of abnormal accruals (Equation 5). We use the following equation to test the 
impact of zombie lending on borrowers‘ reporting opacity:  
Opacity i,t = b0 + b1Zombiei,t-1 + b2Zombiei,t-1 × New Crediti,t + b3 New Crediti,t 
+ b4Sizei,t-1 + b5Turni,t-1 + b6Growthi,t-1 + b7Booklevi,t-1 + 
b8CFOi,t-1 + b9ROAi,t-1 + Industry×Year + εi,t.             (9)                                          
                         
Results reported in panel A of Table 3 show that the coefficients on the 
interaction term between the zombie indicator and new credit are all positive and 
significant, suggesting that lending from banks induces zombie borrowers to 
manipulate their earnings and thereby results in more opaque financial reporting. 
We further test the impact of lending from main banks and find a consistent result 
that main bank lending leads to more opaque financial reporting. In addition, we 
investigate the impact of long-term lending and short-term lending on reporting 
opacity. Results show that longer term lending leads to more opaque financial 
reporting while the impact of short-term lending is much weaker.    
Finally, we test the conjecture that zombie firms are more opaque in general. 
We employ the following regression model: 
Opacityi,t = b0 + b1Zombiei,t-1 + b2Sizei,t-1 + b3Turni,t-1 + b4Growthi,t-1 + 
b5Booklevi,t-1 + b6CFOi,t-1 + b7ROAi,t-1 + Industry ×Year + εi, t.         
                                                          (10)  
                                        
Panel B of Table 3 reports our estimation of Equation (10). In column (1), we 
use an ordinary least squares (OLS) model, without controlling for industry or year 
fixed effects, to estimate the association between the zombie indicator and 
reporting opacity. Results show that the coefficient on zombie is positive and 
significant (coef. =0.002, Se=0.001), implying that zombie firms adopt more 
opaque financial reporting than non-zombie firms. The magnitude is economically 
significant as it represents 6% of the median value of the opacity measure for all 
observations. In column (2), following Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008), we 
further control industry times year fixed effects to take into account possible 
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omitted industry heterogeneities. The coefficient on the zombie indicator is 
positive and significant at the 1% level. In column (3), we use the Fama-MacBeth 
approach to rule out time series variations, leaving only cross-section variations. 
The result still holds as the coefficient on the zombie indicator is positive and 
significant at the 1% level. In column (4), we employ the Kothari, Leone, and 
Wasley (2005) model to re-estimate abnormal accruals and thus reporting opacity. 
Results are robust to this alternative measure.   
 
5.2.3. Zombie lending, earnings manipulations and political motivations. 
As discussed in the section of hypothesis development, the important 
motivations for zombie lending of banks and earnings manipulations of bank 
clients arise from government‘s needs of maintaining a high employment rate and 
comforting the international regulators and investors. Hence, one should expect 
that such motivations would be strengthened in the election years so as to 
maximize political benefits. Along this line, we test whether the observed earnings 
manipulations due to zombie lending are more pronounced during the election 
years in Japan. In particular, we define the years for general elections and elections 
of councillors as election years.
16
 Further, we re-estimate equation (9) for 
sup-samples of election years and non-election years respectively.  
The results in Table 4 show a stronger effect of earnings manipulation due to 
zombie lending in election years, comparing with that in non-election years. This 
finding is consistent with the notion that the nexus between zombie lending and 
earnings manipulation is driven by the political motivations.   
                                                          
16  General election (corresponding fiscal year): 1993, 1996 and 2000. Councillor election 
(corresponding fiscal year):1992, 1995 and 1998.   
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In summary, we find consistent evidence that bank lending encourages 
zombie firms to inflate earnings, thereby leading to more opaque financial 
reporting. Furthermore, we find that informed lending from borrowers‘ main banks 
leads to more earnings manipulation and thus more opaque financial reporting. 
Additional evidence suggests that the impact of longer term lending on zombie 
borrowers‘ reporting opacity is stronger than that of short-term lending. Finally, we 
find consistent evidence that the nexus between zombie lending and earnings 
manipulation is driven by politicians‘ motivations of entertaining voters and 
international regulators.  
 
5.2.4. Endogeneity: Selection model  
Summary statistics show that zombie firms and non-zombie firms differ on 
many dimensions. Although we control for most of these dimensions in our 
multivariate analyses, selection bias could still arise if there are unmeasured 
variables that predict selection into the zombie sample and affect firms‘ reporting 
quality as well. In other words, selection into the zombie sample is not random and 
factors causing this are not observed. To address this concern, we use the 
maximum likelihood method described by Heckman (1979) to control for potential 
selection bias. Use of the two-step treatment procedure allows for obtaining 
consistent estimates for the determinants of bank subsidization. The first step is a 
Probit model that estimates the hazard ratio. The dependent variable equals 1 if a 
firm is subsidized by a bank (zombie firm) in a fiscal year and 0 otherwise. 
Variables reflecting the importance of subsidization but not directly related to 
reporting quality are used as instruments. We use labor density measured by 
employees over total assets as an instrument in the first step. The underlying 
assumption is that labor-intensive firms are more likely to be supported by banks 
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because the Japanese government encourages banks to do so. The second step of 
the treatment procedure is to simply estimate an OLS regression with the hazard 
ratio as an explanatory variable.  
Results for both the binomial probit and the OLS regressions are reported in 
panel A of Table 5. The probit regression provides evidence of the predictors of 
zombie firms. The employees-to-total assets ratio has a positive and significant 
coefficient, suggesting that the government encourages banks to subsidize 
labor-intensive firms to maintain low unemployment. In the second-step OLS 
regression, the hazard ratio obtained from the first step is included along with all 
the other controls. We find consistent results as reported in panels B, C, D, and E 
of Table 4. 
 
5.2.5. Endogeneity: Capital injection, zombie, and financial reporting opacity  
An alternative interpretation of our aforementioned results is that firms 
inherently having more opaque financial reporting obtain more subsidization from 
banks. To rule out this alternative explanation and establish a causal effect from 
zombie lending to opaque financial reporting, we use a natural experiment 
resulting from the capital injection program in the late 1990s and employ a 
difference-in-difference approach.   
Tett and Ibison (2001) and Peek and Rosengren (2005) suggest that the 
Japanese government played an important role in supporting zombie lending in 
Japan in the 1990s. Capital injection into the banking system is closely related to 
zombie lending (Hypothesis 2). Investigating the government bailout program has 
several merits. First, it provides an ideal experiment to overcome the potential 
endogeneity problem in earlier tests. For example, firms‘ financial reporting 
quality can affect banks‘ subsidization. In addition, bank subsidization and firm 
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reporting quality can be jointly determined by unobserved within-firm variation 
that is not controlled in the model. We apply a difference-in-difference approach to 
test the response of zombie firms‘ reporting quality to an exogenous increase in 
bank support resulting from the capital injection program in the late 1990s. Third, 
it helps us better understand how the government bailout program of the banking 
system affects the real sector. The extant literature argues that government bailouts 
are associated with a severe moral hazard problem that has unintended 
consequences. This investigation can provide additional evidence of the 
consequences of misgovernment (Giannetti and Simonov, 2012; Lin, Liu, and 
Srinivasan, 2012).  
The following equation is used to estimate the effect of the capital injection 
program: 
   ∆Opacityi =b0 + b1Zombiei,1998 + b2Zombiei,1998 × Capital Injection 
Exposurei + b3Capital Injection Exposurei + b4∆Sizei + b5∆Turni 
+ b6∆Growthi + b7∆Booklevi + b8∆CFOi + b9∆ROAi + Industry 
+ εi, t,                                           (11)                                                                                            
 
where is defined as the difference between the three-year average absolute 
abnormal accruals before and after 1998; zombie equals 1 if a firm is classified as a 
zombie in 1998 and 0 otherwise. Capital Injection Exposurei is defined in Equation 
(7). ∆Variable is the difference between the three-year average value of a certain 
variable before and after 1998. The sample period is from 1995 through 2000, 
which enables three years of observations before and after 1998. 
 Results are reported in panel A of Table 6. In column (1), we use an 
indicator to capture the extent to which a firm is affected by capital injections. In 
particular, Large Capital Injection Exposure is defined as 1 when firm i‘s exposure 
to the program is larger than the sample median and 0 otherwise. The coefficient 
on the interaction term between zombie and the large capital injection exposure 
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indicator is positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that a zombie firm 
having a larger exposure to the capital injection program is associated with a 
greater increase in reporting opacity during the injection period. In column (2), we 
further control for industry fixed effects and our results remain qualitatively the 
same. In columns (3) and (4), we use a continuous measure of capital injection 
exposure. All results are qualitatively the same. They support Hypothesis 2 that the 
government bailouts in the late 1990s indirectly subsidized insolvent borrowers 
and therefore induced zombie firms to adopt low-quality financial reporting.  
One may argue that banks heavily exposed to hidden losses are more likely to 
be rescued. If these aided banks increase their leading to zombie firms over time, 
our findings could simply be driven by the effect of banks‘ exposure to zombie 
firms. In other words, a bank‘s exposure to zombie firms can determine both the 
probability of being aided and an increase in evergreen lending. To rule out this 
concern, we further control for banks‘ exposure to zombie firms and the interaction 
between zombies and banks‘ exposure to zombie lending in the regression. Results 
reported in panel B of Table 6 suggest that our conclusion is not driven by this 
alternative explanation.  
 
5.2.6 Alternative measures of reporting opacity 
In this section, we conduct robustness tests using alternative measures to 
proxy for reporting opacity. Our first alternative proxy is earnings informativeness, 
as measured by the earnings response coefficients (ERCs), following past studies 
(Francis, Schipper, and Vincent, 2005; Francis and Ke, 2006). In particular, we 
estimate the following cross-sectional model:  
Reti,t = b0 + b1Zombiei,t-1 + b2 ROAi,t-1 + b3 ROAi,t × Zombiei,t-1 + b4 ROAi,t × 
Zombiei,t-1 × New Credit i,t + b5 ROAi,t × New Credit i,t + b6 Zombiei,t-1 × 
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New Credit i,t + b7 New Credit i,t + b8 Booklevi,t + b9 Sizei,t-1 + Industry 
×Year + εi, t.                                        (12) 
 
where Ret is the 12-month buy and hold return beginning 9 months prior to the 
fiscal year-end. More informative earnings suggest a larger reaction of stock return 
to earnings (ROA). Therefore, we should expect the coefficient on ROAi,t × 
Zombiei,t-1 × New Credit i,t  to be negative if the bank lending to zombie borrowers 
reduces the informativeness of earnings numbers. Consistent with this argument, 
the result reported in column (1) of Table 7 shows a lower ERC for a zombie firm 
that receives new credit from a bank, suggesting that bank lending increases the 
reporting opacity of zombie borrowers.  
The second alternative measure that we use is Basu‘s (1997) accounting 
conservatism articular:  
XIi,t = b0 + b1 Reti,t + b2Di,t +b3 Reti,t ×Di,t + b4 Reti,t × Zombiei,t-1 + b5 Di,t × 
Zombiei,t-1 + b6 Reti,t × Di,t × Zombiei,t-1 + b7 Reti,t × New Credit i,t + b8 
Di,t × New Credit i,t+ b9 Reti,t × Di,t × New Credit i,t + b10 Reti,t × 
Zombiei,t-1 × New Credit i,t + b11 Di,t × Zombiei,t-1 × New Credit i,t + b12 
Reti,t ×Di,t × Zombiei,t-1 × New Credit i,t + b13 Reti,t × Sizei,t + b14 Di,t × 
Sizei,t + b15 Reti,t × Di,t × Sizei,t + b16 Reti,t × MBi,t + b17 Di,t × MBi,t + 
b18 Reti,t × Di,t × MBi,t + b19 Reti,t × Booklevi,t + b20 Di,t × Booklevi,t + 
b21 Reti,t × Di,t × Booklevi,t +Industry fixed effect + εi, t.        (13)                          
 
where XIi,t is the net income of firm i in year t scaled by its market value in year t-1, 
Ret is the 12-month buy and hold return beginning 9 months prior to the fiscal 
year-end, and D is the indicator, which equals 1 if Ret is negative and 0 otherwise. 
As shown in column (2) of Table 7, the coefficient on Reti,t ×Di,t × Zombiei,t-1 × 
New Credit i,t  is negative and significant, suggesting that zombie borrowers are 
less conservative in reporting their accounting number when they receive new 
credit from banks.   
 
5.2.7 Alternative measures of zombie  
36 
 
As documented in Fukuda and Nakamura (2011), Caballero, Hoshi, and 
Kashyap‘s (2008) measure can potentially misclassify a good firm as a zombie 
because a healthy firm‘s interest rate can be lower than the prime lending rate. 
Therefore, to rule out the concern that our results are driven by a measurement 
problem associated with the zombie indicator, we modify Caballero, Hoshi, and 
Kashyap‘s (2008) measure with two additional criteria. In particular, firms whose 
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) exceed the hypothetical risk-free interest 
payments are excluded from being classified as zombie firms and firms that are 
unprofitable and highly leveraged (higher than 0.5) and have increased their 
external borrowings are classified as zombie firms. Our inference holds using this 
alternative measure of zombie.   
 
5.3. Financial reporting opacity and contagion effect  
Peer firms play an important role in shaping corporate policies (Bertrand, 
1883; Stigler, 1968; Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen, 2008; Leary and Roberts, 
2012). In this section, we test how a non-zombie firm‘s reporting incentive is 
distorted when its industry is dominated by zombie firms. To test this spill-over 
effect, we use the following identification, in line with Caballero, Hoshi, and 
Kashyap (2008):   
Opacityi t = b0 + b1Non-Zombiei,t-1 + b2Non-Zombiei,t-1 × Zombie Densityi,t-1 + 
b3Sizei,t-1 + b4Turni,t-1 + b5Growthi,t-1 + b6Booklevi,t-1 + b7CFOi,t-1 
+ b8ROAi,t-1 + Industry ×Year + εi,t,                   (14)                                              
 
where Non-zombie is defined as 1 if firm i is not classified as zombie in year t and 
0 otherwise. Two zombie density measures are employed in this study. The first is 
calculated as the raw percentage of zombie firms in the industry for a given year. 
The second is the capital-weighted percentage of zombie firms in the industry for a 
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given year. We control for industry-year fixed effects in the specification and 
therefore the main effect of zombie density is omitted in the estimation.  
Results in Table 8 show that the coefficient on the interaction term between 
non-zombie and zombie density is positive and significant at the 1% level (coef. = 
0.013 with se = 0.005). This result is consistent with Hypothesis 3 that a 
non-zombie firm adopts more opaque financial reporting when its industry is 
dominated by zombie firms.  
Next, we quantify the economic significance of this contagion effect, 
specifically, a contagion in the transmission of poor financial reporting quality 
from zombie firms in an industry to non-zombie firms in the same industry. In 
particular, we estimate the percentage increase in reporting opacity of non-zombie 
firms resulting from zombie density in the industry using the following formula:  
∆Opacity % = b2 × Actual zombie density/Mean value of Opacity.   (15) 
 
We estimate this contagion effect for four industries that are widely argued to 
be associated with severe evergreen lending. They are the wholesale, construction, 
real estate, and service industries (Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap, 2008). Results 
reported in panel B show that, on average, non-zombie firms‘ financial reporting 
becomes 4% to 6% more opaque due to high zombie density in the industry, 
suggesting that the contagion effect is economically significant.  
 
5.3.1. Cost for non-zombie firms to provide high-quality financial statement: 
Contagion effect and product market structure 
 
When zombie density is higher, profitable firms are in a more unfavorable 
position because more competitors (zombie firms) can sell their products at a 
subsidized price. Thus, non-zombie firms have a greater incentive to strategically 
increase their reporting opacity to misguide zombie firms‘ investments and protect 
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their market share (Gigler, 1994; Bushman and Smith, 2001; Bagnoli and Watts, 
2010; Corona and Nan, 2011). Such an incentive is stronger when the market is 
more concentrated (Grossman, 1981; Bagnoli and Watts, 2010; Corona and Nan, 
2011). Therefore, one would expect that the contagion effect is more pronounced 
in concentrated industries if an increase in the cost for non-zombie firms to provide 
high-quality reporting is a key force driving the contagion effect.  
To test this conjecture, we stratify the sample based on the rank in the 
Herfindahl Index (HHI). Results show that the coefficient on the interaction term 
between zombie density and non-zombie is positive and significant for firms in 
more concentrated industries. For less concentrated industries, the contagion effect 
is weaker because the magnitude of the coefficient on the interaction term between 
zombie density and non-zombie is smaller. We further stratify observations based 
on an industry‘s ranking in sales growth. Equation (14) is re-estimated for each 
sample group. Results are reported in panel B of Table 9, which shows that the 
contagion effect is more pronounced in industries with lower sales growth. We do 
not observe a significant contagion effect in industries with higher sales growth. 
 
5.3.2. Benefits for non-zombie firms of providing a high-quality financial statement: 
Contagion effect and hidden losses in banks. 
 
When banks are laden with huge hidden losses, they simply gamble for 
resurrection by growing aggressively, which leads to lax screening and little 
monitoring (Kane, 1989; Niinimaki, 2007). As a result, non-zombie firms have a 
weak incentive to provide high-quality financial reporting to separate themselves 
from zombie firms (Hypothesis 3).  




                          ∑
                        
                             
 
                     
                         
 , (16) 
where borrowing from bank j,i,t denotes firm i‘s borrowing from bank j in year t; 
Total borrowing from bank i,t denotes total borrowing from all banks for firm i in 
year t; Lending to zombiej,t denotes total lending to zombie firms for bank j; and 
Total lending of bank j,t denotes total loans supplied by bank j to listed firms in 
year t.  
We stratify the full sample based on the ranking of Hidden Losses Exposure in 
relationship banks and re-estimate Equation (14) for each sub-group. Results 
reported in Table 10 show that the contagion effect exists for firms whose 
relationship banks are heavily exposed to hidden losses. We do not observe a 
significant contagion effect for firms whose relationship banks are less exposed to 
less hidden losses.   
An important assumption in our test is that hidden losses motivate banks to 
lend aggressively, leading to lax screenings, and lower the benefit to non-zombie 
firms of separating themselves from zombie firms. To add validity to this 
assumption, we examine how the average cost of debt of a non-zombie firm is 
affected by financial opacity and zombie density. As we do not have information 
on the average interest rate, we use the interest expenditure divided by total debt to 
proxy for the average cost of debt. We employ the following model for our 
empirical test: 
          Cost of debti,t = b0 + b1Non-Zombiei,t-1 + b2Non-Zombiei,t-1 × Opacityi,t-1 + 
b3Sizei,t-1 + b5Growthi,t-1 + b6Booklevi,t-1 + b7Turni,t-1 + 
b8Zscorei,t-1 + Firm effect + εi,t.                  (17)  
 
Firms adopting opaque financial reporting should be associated with a high 
cost of debt if banks can effectively screen and monitor borrowers. Thus, the 
coefficient on the interaction term between non-zombie and opacity should be 
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positive as it demonstrates banks‘ monitoring of non-zombies. Meanwhile, the 
coefficient on Non-Zombie indicates the benefit for non-zombie firms of separating 
themselves from zombie firms.  
We stratify the full sample based on the median of capital-weighted zombie 
density and estimate Equation (17) within each sub-sample. Results reported in 
Table 11 suggest that non-zombie firms adopting more opaque financial reporting 
are associated with a higher average cost of debt when the percentage of zombies 
within their industry is low. This is consistent with the monitoring effect of banks 
on borrowers. However, non-zombie firms with opaque financial reporting are 
associated with a lower average cost of debt when the zombie density of the 
industry is high. In addition, the coefficient on Non-Zombie is negative and 
significant, suggesting that the benefit of non-zombie firms separating themselves 
from zombie firms is lower when zombie firms dominate the industry. In 
unreported tables, we further test whether the contagion effect more likely takes 
place among bank dependent firms. Using the median level of bank financing to 
total liability of the firm as a proxy for a company‘s bank dependency, we find a 
stronger contagion effect in sub-samples with higher level of bank dependency.  
In sum, our results suggest that banks‘ hidden losses reduce their screening 
and monitoring incentives. Therefore, healthy firms have weaker incentive to adopt 
high-quality reporting to separate themselves from zombie firms.  
 
5.4. Under-capitalized banks and zombie lending 
Finally, we investigate which banks lend more to zombie firms (Hypothesis 4). 
Theoretically, banks with inadequate capital should have great incentive to 
manipulate their accounting numbers. By lending to zombie firms, banks can 
effectively reduce the loan loss provision and inflate the capital ratio.  
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We merge the Nikkei loan database with the Bankscope database and identify 
163 banks with 919 bank-year observations during the period from 1990 through 
2000. Summary statistics of key variables are presented in panel A of Table 11. 
We find that the mean of ROA for Japanese banks from 1990 through 2000 is 
-0.002, suggesting that on average Japanese banks performed badly during this 
period. Based on banks‘ reported tier 1 capital ratio, approximately 20% was 
under-capitalized. 
To establish the causal effect of banks‘ incentive to manipulate their 
accounting in zombie lending, we estimate the following regression model: 
 Lending to zombiei, = b0 + b1Incentives , + b2Size , + b3Interests ,𝑡 + 
b4Equity ,𝑡 + b5Loan to asset ,𝑡 + b6ROA ,𝑡 + Bank 
effect +   ,𝑡.                              (18)   
 
Several proxies are used to measure banks‘ incentives to manipulate the 
capital ratio. The first is the loan loss provision, scaled by bank assets. Banks with 
a large amount of loan loss provisions have greater incentive to manipulate their 
accounting numbers (Shrieves and Dahl, 2003). The second proxy is the 
non-performing loan ratio. Similarly, banks with a high non-performing loan ratio 
face greater regulatory risk and thus have greater incentive to inflate the capital 
ratio. The last proxy is the under-capitalization indicator (before manipulation). 
Peek and Rosengren (2005) suggest that Japanese banks use various accounting 
gimmicks to inflate the tier 1 ratio. The tier 1 ratio is estimated to be inflated by 
approximately 2%. Thus, the under-capitalization indicator (before manipulation) 
equals 1 if the adjusted tier 1 ratio (reported ratio minus 2%) for a bank is lower 
than the benchmark ratio and 0 otherwise. Results reported in panel B show that 
the coefficients on LLP, NPL, and Under-capitalized (before manipulation) are 
positive and significant, suggesting that banks with large LLP and NPL have 
greater incentive to lend money to zombies to inflate their tier 1 ratio.  
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One concern for this test is that zombie lending can also affect banks‘ LLP 
and capital inadequacy. However, a reverse causality is unlikely to be the case as a 
reverse effect means that banks lend more to zombie firms to increase the LLP or 
NPL. To rule out this concern, we use Peek and Rosengren‘s (2005) argument that 
Japanese banks inflated their tier 1 ratio by around 2%. We regress the zombie 
lending on the under-capitalization indicator (after manipulation) based on the 
original reported capital ratio. Results show that the coefficient is insignificant, 
implying that there is no significant association between under-capitalization and 
zombie lending. Given that Under-capitalization (before manipulation) is 
positively associated with zombie lending, this result suggests that (1) capital 
inadequacy motivates banks to undertake zombie lending and (2) through zombie 
lending, banks can inflate their capital ratio and thus conceal the relationship 




Chapter 6. Conclusion 
 
Keeping insolvent borrowers afloat is accompanied by accounting gimmicks 
and collusion between zombie borrowers and banks in Japan. In this paper, we 
examine this issue by investigating how banks‘ lending to zombie firms affects 
these borrowers‘ reporting quality. Using the employees-to-assets ratio as an 
instrument for zombie firms, we deal with the selection bias problem in our tests. 
In addition, we use a natural experiment resulting from a capital injection program 
in the late 1990s, when banks were recapitalized by the government, to overcome 
the endogeneity problem.  
Our results show that banks encourage zombie firms to manipulate earnings to 
legitimize evergreen lending. In particular, new lending to zombie firms leads to 
inflated total accruals and working capital accruals. Such an effect holds when the 
lending is made by main banks and is more pronounced when the loan tenor is 
longer. Our results are robust to industry and year fixed effects, the Heckman 
regression procedure, and alternative measures of zombie firms. In addition, we 
find that the capital injection program in Japan during the late 1990s indirectly 
supported zombie firms and led to deterioration in reporting quality. We attribute 
this effect to collusion among banks, the government, and zombie firms.  
Furthermore, we find a significant spillover effect of zombie firms on 
non-zombie firms‘ reporting opacity. In particular, we find that profitable firms 
adopt more opaque reporting when their industry is dominated by zombie firms. 
This contagion effect is stronger in more concentrated industries, industries with 
lower sales growth, and firms whose relationship banks are heavily exposed to 
hidden losses. We therefore argue that this spillover effect is a result of an increase 
in the cost of and a reduction in the benefit of truthful reporting for non-zombie 
firm aiming to separate themselves from zombie firms.  
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Finally, we find that banks with a greater incentive to manipulate the capital 
ratio lend more to zombie firms. These results suggest that zombie lending acts as 
a mechanism through which reporting opacity is transmitted from banks to bank 
clients and from bank clients to their industry peers. 
 Our work provides empirical support for a negative consequence of capital 
misallocation for the information environment. We use a setting that overcomes 
endogeneity and provides consistent results. In addition, our work sheds light on 
the impact of industry restructuring due to the recent financial crisis. Our results 
suggest that a depressed restructuring can deteriorate the information environment 
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Appendix A: Definitions of variables 
 
Book Leverage: Total Debt divided by Total Asset (FB067). Total Debt is defined 
as the sum of the following data items: We classify total debt into short term and 
long term. We define short term debt as the sum of the following: Short Term 
loans, bank overdraft and due loan within a year (FB074), Commercial Paper 
(FB075), Long term debt that matures within one year (FB076), Corporate Bonds 
and Convertible Bonds redeemable within one year (FB077), and Derivative Debt 
(FB0159). We define long term debt as the sum of the following data items: 
Corporate Bonds and Convertible Bonds with maturity more than one year 
(FB098), Long Term Loan (FB101) and Unconsolidated affiliate long term debt 
(FB102). 
Cash Flow: Net Income before extraordinary items and depreciation (FC029), 
scaled by capital (FB032) in the previous year.  
PPE: Tangible Fixed Asset (FB032).  
ROA: EBIT divided by Total Asset (FB067). 
Turn: The sale to asset ratio. 
Growth: Sales in current year – Sales in previous year, scaled by the sales in the 
previous year. Data item for Sales is FC001.  
Assets: Total Asset (FB067) 
Zombie: Following CHK (2008) measure, See Equation (1).  
Zombie density 1: The percentage of zombie in the industry  
Zombie density 2: The capital weighted percentage of zombie in the industry  
Hidden Losses Exposure:   where  is bank i's zombie lending divided by its 
total lending in year t,  is the fraction of loan from bank i in total loan of the firm. 
See Equation (14) 
Capital Injection Exposure: The fraction of loans from capital injected banks in 
1998. See Equation (7) 
Total abnormal accrual: estimated using modified Jones model 
Opacity: The 3 year moving average of absolute value of future abnormal accruals. 
The estimation of abnormal accruals follows modified John's model.  
Main bank: Main banks are 18 major cities, trust, and long-term credit banks in 
Japan that are capable of functioning as guarantors of bond issues of corporations. 
Firms with the largest outstanding loan share from one of these 18 banks are 
defined as main-bank-system firms. 
Ln (New Credit): The natural log of the increase in total loan outstanding relative 
to previous years.  
New Credit: defined as 1 if the increase in total loan outstanding relative to 
previous year is large than 0 and 0 otherwise. 
New Credit (long): defined as 1 if the increase in long-term loan outstanding 
relative to previous year is large than 0 and 0 otherwise. Long-term loan is a 
lending with a tenor longer than 1 year.  
New Credit (Short): defined as 1 if the increase in short-term loan outstanding 
relative to previous year is large than 0 and 0 otherwise.  
Cost of debt: interest expenditure divided by total debt  
Lending to Zombie: defined as the fraction of lending to zombie firms in total 
lending.  
LLP: total loan loss provision divided by total assets 
NPL: total non-performing loan divided by total loan  
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Under-capitalized (after manipulation): equals to 1 if the Tier 1 ratio of a bank 
is lower than the benchmark ratio (8% for banks with international branches and 4% 
for other banks) 
Under-capitalized (before manipulation): equals to 1 if the adjusted Tier 1 ratio 
(minus 2%) is lower than the benchmark ratio (8% for banks with international 
















































Appendix B: The validity of modified Jones’ model using Japanese data.  
 
(1) Earning manipulation around zero earnings in Japan 
 
 
We divide all Japanese listed firms with ROA ranging from [-0.08 to 0.07] into 30 
groups (the size of each is 0.005) and plot their distribution in above figure. The 
figure shows a sharp jump in the number of observations for group 17
th
 which 
consists of firms with ROA ranging from 0 to 0.005. This finding is consistent with 
the notion that firms try to manipulate their earnings to meet the threshold of zero 
ROA (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). As such, the observations with small 
positive earnings (observations in group 17
th
) are defined as suspicious firms that 



































(2) Suspicious companies and abnormal accruals estimated by modified Jones’ 
model.   
This table presents the association between abnormal accruals estimated by modified Jones‘ 
model and earnings manipulations described in the above figure. SUSP is defined as 1 if the 
ROA of the observation is within the range between 0 and 0.005, and 0 otherwise. The 
definitions of SIZE, TRUN, ROA, BOOKLEV, GROWTH and CFO are described in appendix 
A. The standard errors are clustered by two-digit industry code, and are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. ***. **. * indicate significance levels at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 using two-tail 
tests, respectively.  
 Abnormal Accruals 
SUSP 0.006** 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
SIZE -0.001 -0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
TURN -0.004 -0.004*** 
 (0.004) (0.001) 
GROWTH 0.017*** 0.018*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) 
BOOKLEV -0.011*** -0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
CFO 0.009 0.005 
 (0.018) (0.006) 
ROA 0.087*** 0.083*** 
 (0.023) (0.013) 
CONS 0.010 0.014*** 
 (0.010) (0.004) 
N 21101 21101 
Fixed effect Industry times Year Industry and Year 



















Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
The table shows summary statistics of key variables in the empirical analysis. The sample periods of 
panel A and B are from 1990 – 2000. In panel C, the sample period is from 1995 – 2000. ∆OPACITY 
is defined as the average of absolute abnormal accruals during 1998 to 2000 minus the average of 
absolute abnormal accruals during 1995 to 1997. The capital injection exposure is defined as a firm's 
borrowing from capital injected banks divided by the total borrowing. Large capital injection 
exposure equals to 1 when the capital injection exposure is above the industry median value and 0 
otherwise. Similarly, the variable reflecting the first difference is defined as the change of the mean 
value during 1998 to 2000 relative to the mean value during 1995 to 1997.  See Appendix for all 
variable definitions. 
 
Panel A: Firm Characteristics: 
Variables OBS MEAN STD Q1 MEDIAN Q3 
OPACITY 23479 0.040 0.027 0.021 0.033 0.051 
ZOMBIE 24139 10.874 1.411 9.881 10.710 11.706 
SIZE 24139 1.021 0.529 0.675 0.923 1.262 
TURN 22639 0.019 0.164 -0.053 0.009 0.069 
GROWTH 24139 0.277 0.195 0.121 0.258 0.409 
BOOKLEV 24139 0.058 0.069 0.020 0.056 0.095 
CFO 24139 0.035 0.039 0.015 0.033 0.054 
ROA 23479 0.040 0.027 0.021 0.033 0.051 
DENSITY2     
24139 0.090 0.119 0.023 0.056 0.121 
       
 
Panel B: 
 Zombie None-zombie  
Variables OBS MEDIAN OBS MEDIAN Dif 
OPACITY 2525 0.039 20954 0.033 0.006*** 
SIZE 2696 10.390 21443 10.743 -0.353*** 
GROWTH 2422 0.000 20217 0.010 -0.01*** 
BOOKLEV 2696 0.275 21443 0.257 0.015*** 





Zombie with large exposure 
to capital injection in1998 
Zombie with small exposure to 
capital injection in1998 
 
Variables OBS MEAN OBS MEAN Dif 
∆OPACITY 157 0.003 80 -0.005 0.008* 
∆SIZE 157 -0.039 80 -0.016 -0.023 
∆GROWTH 150 -0.081 77 -0.043 -0.038*** 
∆BOOKLEV 157 0.005 80 -0.009 0.014 
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Table 2 New lending, zombie firms and earnings manipulations. 
 
The definition of zombie follows Caballero et.al (2008). New credit equals to 1 when a firm received 
new credits and 0 otherwise. New credit (long) equals to 1 when a firm received new long-term credit 
and 0 otherwise. New credit (short) equals to 1 when a firm received new short-term credit and 0 
otherwise. The dependent variable is the abnormal accrual estimated by Modified Jones model in 
Panel A, and abnormal working capital accrual in Panel B. Other Controls include SIZE, TRUN, ROA, 
BOOKLEV, GROWTH and CFO. The sample period is from 1990 to 2000. The standard errors are 
clustered by two-digit industry code, and are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***. **. * indicate 
significance levels at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 using two-tail tests, respectively. See Appendix for all 
variable definitions.  
 
Panel A: Total Accrual Management  
Variables Abnormal Total Accrual 
ZOMBIE -0.008*** -0.005** -0.004 -0.007** -0.006*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
ZOMBIE× LN (NEW CREDIT) 0.003**     
 (0.001)     
LN (NEW CREDIT) 0.002***     
 (0.000)     
ZOMBIE× NEW CREDIT(MAINBANK)  0.011**    
  (0.004)    
NEW CREDIT(MAINBANK)  0.014***    
  (0.001)    
ZOMBIE×NEWCREDIT(OTHERBANK)   0.008   
   (0.009)   
NEW CREDIT(OTHERBANK)   0.005***   
   (0.001)   
ZOMBIE×NEW CREDIT(LONG)    0.019**  
    (0.008)  
NEW CREDIT(LONG)    0.011***  
    (0.001)  
ZOMBIE× NEW CREDIT(SHORT)     0.010*** 
     (0.003) 
NEW CREDIT(SHORT)     0.017*** 
     (0.001) 
Other Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry × Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 21101 21101 21101 21101 21101 



















Panel B: Working Capital Accrual Management  
Variables Abnormal Working Capital Accrual 
ZOMBIE 0.001 -0.005** 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ZOMBIE× LN (NEW CREDIT) 0.001**     
 (0.000)     
LN (NEW CREDIT) 0.000***     
 (0.000)     
ZOMBIE× NEW CREDIT(MAINBANK)  0.010**    
  (0.004)    
NEW CREDIT(MAINBANK)  0.014***    
  (0.001)    
ZOMBIE×NEWCREDIT(OTHERBANK)   0.003   
   (0.003)   
NEW CREDIT(OTHERBANK)   0.000   
   (0.001)   
ZOMBIE×NEW CREDIT(LONG)    0.007**  
    (0.003)  
NEW CREDIT(LONG)    0.003***  
    (0.001)  
ZOMBIE× NEW CREDIT(SHORT)     0.002 
     (0.003) 
NEW CREDIT(SHORT)     0.006*** 
     (0.001) 
Other Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry × Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 21101 21101 20581 20581 20581 































Table 3: The zombie lending and reporting opacity 
 
This table reports the association between zombie lending and reporting opacity. The dependent 
variable is reporting opacity. The sample period is from 1990 to 2000. Other Controls include SIZE, 
TRUN, ROA, BOOKLEV, GROWTH and CFO. The standard errors are clustered by two-digit 
industry code, and are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***. **. * indicate significance levels at 0.01, 




ZOMBIE 0.002* 0.003** 0.003*** 0.002* 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ZOMBIE× LN (NEW CREDIT) 0.001***     
 (0.000)     
LN (NEW CREDIT) -0.000**     
 (0.000)     
ZOMBIE× NEW CREDIT(MAINBANK)  0.004*    
  (0.002)    
NEW CREDIT(MAINBANK)  -0.001    
  (0.001)    
ZOMBIE×NEWCREDIT(OTHERBANK)   0.001   
   (0.003)   
NEW CREDIT(OTHERBANK)   -0.002**   
   (0.001)   
ZOMBIE×NEW CREDIT(LONG)    0.004**  
    (0.002)  
NEW CREDIT(LONG)    -0.002***  
    (0.001)  
ZOMBIE× NEW CREDIT(SHORT)     -0.001 
     (0.001) 
NEW CREDIT(SHORT)     -0.001 
     (0.000) 
Other Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry × Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 20674 20674 20674 20674 20674 
























(1) (2) Fama-MacBeth 
Fama-MacBeth 
(Kothari) 
ZOMBIE 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
SIZE -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TURN -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
GROWTH 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.006** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
BOOKLEV -0.004* 0.001 -0.000 0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
CFO -0.001 0.002 -0.004 -0.007* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
ROA -0.036*** -0.032*** -0.025* 0.005 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) 
CONSTANT 0.047*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.071*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) 
Industry Effects No No Yes Yes 
Industry × Year Effects No YES No No 
Observations 20472 20472 20472 20674 
































Table 4 : Zombie lending, earnings manipulations and political motivations. 
 
The dependent variable is reporting opacity. The sample period is from 1990 to 2000. Other Controls 
include SIZE, TRUN, ROA, BOOKLEV, GROWTH and CFO. ELE takes value 1 if the fiscal year 
equals to 1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1998, or 2000. The standard errors are clustered by two-digit 
industry code, and are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***. **. * indicate significance levels at 0.01, 
0.05 and 0.10 using two-tail tests, respectively. See Appendix for all variable definitions.  
 
Variables Total Abnormal Accruals  Abnormal Working Capital Accruals 
 NON-ELE ELE NON-ELE ELE 
ZOMBIE 0.0020 -0.0003 -0.0072** -0.0089** 
 (0.0028) (0.0019) (0.0029) (0.0035) 
ZOMBIE× LN (NEW 
CREDIT) 
0.0006 0.0014*** 0.0023** 0.0039** 
 (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0019) 
LN (NEW CREDIT) 0.0003* 0.0006*** 0.0016*** 0.0017*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
SIZE -0.0007 -0.0014*** -0.0013*** -0.0014** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) 
TURN 0.0018 -0.0011 -0.0062*** -0.0030 
 (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0024) 
GROWTH 0.0004 0.0090* 0.0150*** 0.0191*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0048) (0.0038) (0.0056) 
BOOKLEV -0.0154*** -0.0143*** -0.0111** -0.0227*** 
 (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0046) (0.0038) 
CFO -0.0983*** -0.0228*** -0.0075 0.0375*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0072) (0.0183) (0.0135) 
ROA 0.1552*** 0.1151*** 0.1170*** 0.0668*** 
 (0.0218) (0.0261) (0.0273) (0.0215) 
CONSTANT 0.0170*** 0.0163*** 0.0160*** 0.0159* 
 (0.0054) (0.0060) (0.0058) (0.0085) 
Industry × Year Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 8893 11688 9083 12018 





Table 5: The zombie lending and reporting opacity: Treatment approach 
 
This table reports robustness check for the association between zombie lending and reporting opacity. 
We employ treatment two-step regression using employee to asset ratio as an instrument variable. 
Other Controls include SIZE, TRUN, ROA, BOOKLEV, GROWTH and CFO. We include industry 
multiplies year fixed effect in the regression reported in Panel B, C, and D. The sample period is from 
1990 to 2000. The standard errors are clustered by two-digit industry code, and are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. ***. **. * indicate significance levels at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 using two-tail tests, 
respectively. See Appendix for all variable definitions 
 








































Panel B: Second step  
Variables Abnormal Total Accrual 
ZOMBIE -0.008*** -0.005** 0.003*** -0.008** -0.007*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
ZOMBIE× LN (NEW CREDIT) 0.003**     
 (0.001)     
LN (NEW CREDIT) 0.002***     
 (0.000)     
ZOMBIE× NEW CREDIT(MAINBANK)  0.011**    
  (0.004)    
NEW CREDIT(MAINBANK)  0.013***    
  (0.001)    
ZOMBIE×NEWCREDIT(OTHERBANK)   (0.003)   
   -0.002**   
NEW CREDIT(OTHERBANK)   (0.001)   
   (0.003)   
ZOMBIE×NEW CREDIT(LONG)    0.019**  
    (0.008)  
NEW CREDIT(LONG)    0.011***  
    (0.001)  
ZOMBIE× NEW CREDIT(SHORT)     0.010*** 
     (0.003) 
NEW CREDIT(SHORT)     0.017*** 
     (0.001) 
Hazard Lambda -0.015 -0.014 -0.012 -0.017 -0.016 
 (0.018) (0.023) (0.013) (0.020) (0.023) 
Panel C: Second step 
Variables Abnormal Working Capital Accrual 
ZOMBIE 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ZOMBIE× LN (NEW CREDIT) 0.001**     
 (0.000)     
LN (NEW CREDIT) 0.000***     
 (0.000)     
ZOMBIE× NEW CREDIT(MAINBANK)  0.002    
  (0.004)    
NEW CREDIT(MAINBANK)  0.004***    
  (0.001)    
ZOMBIE×NEWCREDIT(OTHERBANK)   0.002   
   (0.002)   
NEW CREDIT(OTHERBANK)   0.000   
   (0.001)   
ZOMBIE×NEW CREDIT(LONG)    0.007**  
    (0.003)  
NEW CREDIT(LONG)    0.003***  
    (0.001)  
ZOMBIE× NEW CREDIT(SHORT)     0.002 
     (0.003) 
NEW CREDIT(SHORT)     0.006*** 
     (0.001) 
Hazard Lambda 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 








Panel D: Second step 
Variables Reporting opacity 
ZOMBIE 0.002* 0.003** 0.003*** 0.002* 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ZOMBIE× LN (NEW CREDIT) 0.001***     
 (0.000)     
LN (NEW CREDIT) -0.000**     
 (0.000)     
ZOMBIE× NEW CREDIT(MAINBANK)  0.004*    
  (0.002)    
NEW CREDIT(MAINBANK)  -0.001    
  (0.001)    
ZOMBIE×NEWCREDIT(OTHERBANK)   0.001   
   (0.003)   
NEW CREDIT(OTHERBANK)   -0.002**   
   (0.001)   
ZOMBIE×NEW CREDIT(LONG)    0.004**  
    (0.002)  
NEW CREDIT(LONG)    -0.002***  
    (0.001)  
ZOMBIE× NEW CREDIT(SHORT)     -0.001 
     (0.001) 
NEW CREDIT(SHORT)     -0.001 
     (0.000) 
Hazard Lambda -0.011 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 






















Industry Effects              YES 







Table 6: The capital injection 
 
This table reports the results of how capital injection affects the reporting quality of zombie firms. 
The dependent variable is defined as the average of absolute abnormal accruals during 1998 to 2000 
minus the average of absolute abnormal accruals during 1995 to 1997. Similarly, the independent 
variables are defined as the change in mean value during 1998 to 2000 relative to the mean value 
during 1995 to 1997. The sample period is from 1995 to 2000. The capital injection exposure is 
defined as a firm's borrowing from recapitalized banks divided by the total borrowing. Large capital 
injection exposure equals to 1 when the capital injection exposure is larger than the sample median 
value and 0 otherwise. The standard errors are clustered by two-digit industry code, and are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. ***. **. * indicate significance levels at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 using two-tail tests, 
respectively. See Appendix for all variable definitions.   
 
Panel A 
Variables ∆OPACITY ∆OPACITY ∆OPACITY ∆OPACITY 
ZOMBIE -0.010*** -0.009** -0.014** -0.013** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
ZOMBIE × LARGE CAPITAL 
INJECTION EXPOSURE 0.012*** 0.011**   
 (0.004) (0.005)   
ZOMBIE × CAPITAL INJECTION 
EXPOSURE   0.018** 0.017** 
   (0.008) (0.008) 
LARGE  CAPITAL INJECTION 
EXPOSURE -0.003** -0.004**   
 (0.002) (0.002)   
CAPITAL INJECTION EXPOSURE   -0.003 -0.003 
   (0.002) (0.003) 
∆SIZE -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.020*** -0.023*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
∆TURN -0.012* -0.011* -0.012* -0.011* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
∆GROWTH 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
∆BOOKLEV 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.011 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
∆CFO 0.045** 0.049*** 0.044** 0.049*** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
∆ROA 0.031 0.029 0.033 0.031 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) 
CONSTANT 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003* 0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Industry Effects NO Yes NO Yes 
Observations 1589 1589 1589 1589 















Variables ∆OPACITY ∆OPACITY 
ZOMBIE -0.019** -0.021** 
 (0.009) (0.010) 
ZOMBIE × LARGE CAPITAL INJECTION 
EXPOSURE 0.011**  
 (0.005)  
ZOMBIE × CAPITAL INJECTION EXPOSURE  0.017* 
  (0.009) 
LARGE  CAPITAL INJECTION EXPOSURE -0.005**  
 (0.002)  
CAPITAL INJECTION EXPOSURE  -0.005 
  (0.004) 
ZOMBIE × BANK EXPOSURE TO ZOMBIE 0.055 0.046 
 (0.053) (0.055) 
BANK EXPOSURE TO ZOMBIE 0.018 0.020 
 (0.014) (0.018) 
∆SIZE -0.022*** -0.022*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
∆TURN -0.011 -0.010 
 (0.006) (0.007) 
∆GROWTH 0.004 0.004 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
∆BOOKLEV 0.010 0.010 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
∆CFO 0.048*** 0.049*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) 
∆ROA 0.027 0.028 
 (0.037) (0.037) 
CONSTANT 0.001 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Industry Effects      Yes       Yes 
Observations       1589       1589 


























Table 7: Alternative measures of reporting opacity 
 
The dependent variable in the first column is the stock return. The dependent variable in second 
column is the net income in year t scaled by total market value in year t-1. Other control variables are 
specified in equations (12) and (13). The standard errors are clustered by two-digit industry code, and 
are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***. **. * indicate significance levels at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 using 
two-tail tests, respectively. See Appendix for all variable definitions.   
 
 (1) (2) 
 RET XI 
ROA 1.531***  
 (0.155)  
ROA ×ZOMBIE 0.427  
 (0.399)  
ROA ×ZOMBIE× NEW CREDIT -1.175*  
 (0.592)  
ZOMBIE×NEW CREDIT 0.015  
 (0.023)  
ROA ×NEW CREDIT -0.017  
 (0.130)  
ZOMBIE -0.015 -0.004 
 (0.013) (0.015) 
NEW CREDIT -0.008  
 (0.007)  
RET  -0.010 
  (0.034) 
D  -0.036 
  (0.035) 
RET× D  -0.192 
  (0.162) 
RET ×ZOMBIE  0.018 
  (0.020) 
D ×ZOMBIE  0.002 
  (0.018) 
RET × D ×ZOMBIE  0.047 
  (0.039) 
RET ×NEW CREDIT  -0.006 
  (0.005) 
D ×NEW CREDIT  -0.024** 
  (0.011) 
RET × D ×NEW CREDIT  -0.082* 
  (0.046) 
RET × D ×NEW CREDIT × ZOMBIE  -0.083* 
  (0.044) 
RET ×NEW CREDIT ×ZOMBIE  -0.025 
  (0.032) 
D × NEW CREDIT × ZOMBIE  0.005 
  (0.019) 
66 
 
CONTROLS YES YES 
Industry × Year Effects YES NO 
Industry  NO YES 
Year Effects NO YES 
Observations 13806 13695 











































Table 8: The contagion effect 
 
This table reports the contagion effect resulting from a high zombie density. The dependent variable 
is reporting opacity. Zombie desity1 is defined as the percentage of zombie in the industry in a given 
year. Zombie desity2 is defined as the capital weighted percentage of zombie in the industry in a 
given year. The sample period is from 1990 to 2000. In Panel B, we quantify the economic 
significance of contagion effect for 4 zombie-dominated industries. The standard errors are clustered 
by two-digit industry code, and are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***. **. * indicate significance levels 
at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 using two-tail tests, respectively. See Appendix for all variable definitions.   
 
Panel A 
Variables (1) (2) 
NON-ZOMBIE -0.005*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
NON-ZOMBIE × ZOMBIE DENSITY1 0.013**  
 (0.005)  
NON-ZOMBIE × ZOMBIE DENSITY2  0.011** 
  (0.005) 
SIZE -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
TURN -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
GROWTH 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
BOOKLEV 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
CFO -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
ROA 0.013** 0.013** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
CONSTANT 0.069*** 0.069*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Industry × Year Effects     Yes    Yes 
Observations     20674    20674 
Adj R-squared 0.096    0.096 
 
Panel B 
 Wholesale Construction Real estate Service 
Average zombie density (Raw 
percentage) 
13% 12% 16% 18% 
The increase in reporting opacity : 
Comparing to the case of zero 
zombie density (∆%) 












Table 9: The contagion effect and product market structure  
 
The dependent variable is reporting opacity. Zombie desity1 is defined as the percentage of zombie in 
the industry in a given year. Zombie desity2 is defined as the capital weighted percentage of zombie 
in the industry in a given year.  Concentrated industry is defined as 1 if the HHI index is large than 
the sample median, and 0 otherwise. The sample period is from 1990 to 2000. The standard errors are 
clustered by two-digit industry code, and are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***. **. * indicate 
significance levels at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 using two-tail tests, respectively. See Appendix for all 
variable definitions.   
 
Panel A: Product Market Concentration 
Variables   Concentrated Industry 
NON-ZOMBIE -0.002 -0.002** -0.009*** -0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
NON-ZOMBIE × ZOMBIE 
DENSITY1 0.005  0.020***  
 (0.015)  (0.005)  
NON-ZOMBIE × ZOMBIE 
DENSITY2  0.014  0.015*** 
  (0.008)  (0.004) 
SIZE -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TURN -0.004* -0.004* -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
GROWTH 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
BOOKLEV -0.002 -0.002 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
CFO -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.012) (0.012) 
ROA 0.015 0.015 0.010 0.010 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) 
CONSTANT 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.069*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Industry × Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11685 11685 8989 8989 























Panel B: Industrial Sales Growth.   
Variables Low Growth High Growth 
NON-ZOMBIE -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.002 -0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
NON-ZOMBIE × ZOMBIE 
DENSITY1 0.029***  -0.006  
 (0.008)  (0.008)  
NON-ZOMBIE × ZOMBIE 
DENSITY2  0.026***  -0.003 
  (0.005)  (0.004) 
SIZE -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TURN -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GROWTH 0.004** 0.004** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
BOOKLEV 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
CFO -0.001 -0.001 -0.020** -0.020** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
ROA 0.016 0.016 0.010 0.010 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) 
CONSTANT 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Industry × Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12225 12225 8449 8449 


































Table 10: The contagion effect and hidden losses in banking system 
 
The dependent variable is reporting opacity. Zombie desity1 is defined as the percentage of zombie in 
the industry in a given year. Zombie density2 is defined as the capital weighted percentage of zombie 
in the industry in a given year. The sample period is from 1990 to 2000. The standard errors are 
clustered by two-digit industry code, and are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***. **. * indicate 
significance levels at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 using two-tail tests, respectively. See Appendix for all 
variable definitions.   
 
Variables 
Small exposure to hidden losses 
Large exposure to hidden 
losses 
NON-ZOMBIE -0.000 -0.001 -0.006*** -0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
NON-ZOMBIE × ZOMBIE 
DENSITY1 -0.009  0.016**  
 (0.016)  (0.007)  
NON-ZOMBIE × ZOMBIE 
DENSITY2  -0.005  0.014*** 
  (0.013)  (0.004) 
SIZE -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
TURN -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
GROWTH 0.004** 0.004** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
BOOKLEV 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.007 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
CFO -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
ROA 0.036* 0.036* -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) 
CONSTANT -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Industry × Year Effects    Yes     Yes   Yes    Yes 
Observations    8296     8296  8285    8285 

















Table 11: Zombie density, hidden losses and lax screening of banks 
 
This table reports the average cost of debt for non-zombie. The dependent variable is the average cost 
of debt, which is defined as the interest expenditure divided by total debt. High zombie industry is an 
industry with higher than median level of capital weighted zombie density in a given year. The 
sample period is from 1990 to 2000. The standard errors are clustered by two-digit industry code, and 
are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***. **. * indicate significance levels at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 using 
two-tail tests, respectively. See Appendix for all variable definitions.   
 
Variables Low zombie industry High zombie industry 
NON-ZOMBIE 0.004 0.008* 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
NON-ZOMBIE × OPACITY  0.207* -0.000 
 (0.110) (0.057) 
OPACITY -0.196 0.044 
 (0.123) (0.058) 
SIZE -0.023** -0.005 
 (0.010) (0.013) 
GROWTH 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
BOOKLEV -0.007 -0.037* 
 (0.016) (0.019) 
TURN 0.006 0.009 
 (0.009) (0.010) 
ZSCORE 0.008*** 0.006 
 (0.001) (0.004) 
CONSTANT 0.285** 0.087 
 (0.117) (0.154) 
Firm effect        Yes     Yes 
Observations       7354     5337 



















Table 12: Under-capitalized bank and zombie lending 
 
Panel A provides the summary statistics of bank characteristics. Panel B reports the association 
between banks' capital inadequacy and zombie lending. The definition of zombie follows Caballero 
et.al (2008). The dependent variable in Panel B is the fraction of zombie lending in total lending of a 
bank. The sample period is from 1990 to 2000. We report in parentheses t-statistics based on standard 
errors that are clustered by bank, and are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***. **. * indicate significance 
levels at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 using two-tail tests, respectively. See Appendix for all variable 
definitions 
 
Panel A: Bank Characteristics 
Variables OBS MEAN STD Q1 MEDIAN Q3 
ZOMBIE LENDING 818 0.275 0.217 0.130 0.233 0.343 
ROA 905 -0.002 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.001 
SIZE 905 7.994 1.499 6.812 7.700 8.920 
LOAN TO ASSET 905 0.707 0.909 0.660 0.722 0.767 
INTEREST TO ASSET 905 1.694 0.651 1.370 1.880 2.140 
EQUITY TO LIABILITY 905 4.110 1.739 3.280 3.960 4.750 
UNDER 
CAPITALIZED(after 
manipulation)  905 0.183 0.384 0.000 0.000 0.000 
UNDER 
CAPITALIZED(before 
manipulation) 905 0.291 0.454 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ZOMBIE LENDING 818 0.275 0.217 0.130 0.233 0.343 







































ROA 0.449 2.741 0.489 0.411 
 (1.352) (1.782) (1.379 (1.361) 
SIZE 0.031 0.105 0.013 0.032 
 (0.107) (0.106) (0.104) (0.108) 
NET LOAN TO ASSET 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
INTEREST TO ASSET 0.054 0.042 0.063 0.055 
 (0.078) (0.059) (0.078) (0.078) 
EQUITY TO LIABILITY -0.009 -0.015 -0.014 -0.008 
 (0.01) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
LLP TO ASSET 4.806*** 2.322 4.174** 4.866*** 
 (1.783) (2.096) (1.744 (1.771) 
NPL TO GROSS LOAN  0.017***   
  (0.005)   
UNDER CAPITALIZED(before 
manipulation)  
 0.043**  
   (0.021)  
UNDER CAPITALIZED(after 
manipulation)  
  -0.012 
    (0.016) 
CONSTANT 0.081 0.557 0.084 0.141 
 (0.951) (0.716) (0.955) (0.926) 
Bank fixed  Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 815 708 815 815 















Figure 1: Prevalence of zombie firms in Japan 
 





























Figure 3: Industrial zombie density and capital investment 
 



















0 0.2 0.4 0.6
Capital Investment 
Investment
















































-2 -1 0 1 2
Zombie Lending and Abnormal Accrual 
non-zombie
zombie
